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Tropical  deforestation  has become the subject of considerable debate  and
concern.  Experts disagree over how quickly tree-covered land near the equator
is  being cleared  (Lanly,  1982)  and  deforestation's  impacts on global  climate
(Detwiler and Hall,  1988).  By contrast, the claim that land clearing
threatens the world's stock of "biological  information"  is  less  controversial.
Tropical  forests'  high biological  diversity is  indisputable;  although they
cover less  than  10  percent of the Earth's  land surface, they contain
approximately half the world's plant and animal  species  (Wilson, 1988).
Concern over the  impacts of tropical  deforestation in  Africa, Asia, and
Latin America has  begun to  stimulate analysis of national  policies
conditioning human  interaction with natural  environments in  the developing
world.  World Bank economists  have found that subsidies and  tax breaks
encourage land clearing  in  the Brazilian Amazon  (Binswanger,  1989;  Mahar,
1989).  In  addition,  the argument is  made that  rural  development  policies
pursued in  a  number of countries displace the  rural  poor, who tend  to resettle
in  environmentally  fragile hinterlands  (Blaikie, 1985).  To date,  however,
investigation of the social  context of deforestation has not  included much
analysis of the tenurial  incentives at work along expanding agricultural
frontiers.  This is  a  serious omission since,  as  Bromley and Cernea  (1989)
point out,  tangible environmental  problems in  developing countries are  often a
manifestation of underlying  institutional  crisis.
This paper addresses  that crisis, tropical  deforestation in  Ecuador
serving  as a  case  study.  To begin, the tenure regime facing those who live in
or  use tree-covered  land in  that country,  is  described.  Next,  four specific
institutional  incentives  for deforestation in  Ecuador and other Latin American
countries  are examined.  First, the waste  and misuse of forest  resources is,2
in  part, a  classic open access  problem.  Second,  stipulating that
deforestation is  a  prerequisite for land tenure  sets  in  motion  a  cycle of
excessive land clearing  and erosive farming.  Third, bureaucratically  induced
tenure insecurity further diminishes private  incentives to  conserve natural
resources  Fourth,  formal  property law in  Latin America  induces  the demise of
indigenous  common property  regimes, which  have long provided a framework for
sustainable agriculture and  forest conservation.
Based on  an  examination of these four institutional  incentives, we
conclude this paper with a  discussion of policy reforms  needed to  ensure the
conservation of Latin America's  tropical  forests.
THE TENURIAL ENVIRONMENT IN  ECUADOR
It  is  appropriate to begin an overview of any Latin American country's
institutional  regime by  recognizing that the state makes extensive claims on
the  natural  environment.  In  Ecuador, for example, subsurface resources  are
government property.  With  passage of the  1972 Water Law,  all  water resources
were nationalized.  Coastal  wetlands are  "national  patrimonies."  Similarly,
most of the country's tree-covered  land is  designated  as  "forest patrimony" or
national  parks.
These claims  far outstrip the government's capacity to manage resources
or even to  ensure that  its claims  are honored  by the public at large.  Weak
management of Ecuador's public forests  is  a  case in  point.  No  rangers work in
the 2,000,000 HA of forest patrimony delimited  in  the northwestern  and
northeastern  parts of the country  (MAG, 1987)  and,  as  of 1987,  a  mere two
administrators,  25  technicians, and  119 permanent  and  seasonal  rangers  had
been  assigned to  the  2,100,000 HA of parks in  continental  Ecuador  (DINAF,3
1988).
A  marked discrepancy between public sector claims on resources  and  the
government's capacity to control  access to  "its  properties"  can  bring about
what Hardin  (1968) calls a "tragedy of the commons."  Recognizing the
potential  for open access problems,  Ecuador's government  allows  individuals
and firms  to  acquire public lands.  However, ecosystem destruction is
typically a prerequisite for private tenure.  Private parties interested in
forest management, for example, cannot acquire legal  interests in  tree-covered
land,  timber concessions having been  banned in  1982.  Instead,  the Ecuadorian
Institute for Agrarian Reform and Colonization  (IERAC)  has  only adjudicated a
claim for private  tenure in  a frontier parcel  if  at  least half of that parcel
had been  cleared.
By no means does deforestation win  an agricultural  colonist  formal
tenure quickly.  IERAC requires a  long time, often years, to  adjudicate claims
for formal  property rights.  Delays are explained in  part by administrative
constraints.  IERAC's  record-keeping system is  extremely cumbersome and  the
agency did not acquire  its first  computer until  the late  1980s.  In  addition,
the  complexity of formal  property law draws out the adjudication  process.  As
Seligson  (1984)  points  out,  IERAC is  obliged to execute ten  separate
procedures during  the  course of settling a  tenure claim.
To complete a  description of institutional  conditions in  Ecuador's
tropical  forests, one must consider the  impacts of formal  property law on  the
country's  indigenous  inhabitants.  Those impacts  have been  the subject of a
great deal  of anthropological  research.  Macdonald  (1981)  reports,  for
example, that the periodic  fallowing scheme long practiced  by the Amerindian
community of Pasu  Urcu, in  eastern  Ecuador, was abandoned during the  1970s4
after  IERAC agents  informed the community that fallow lands  could be claimed
by agricultural  colonists, who were 50 KM away at the time.  This and  other
case studies suggest  that Amerindians respond to  tenurial  incentives much as
do agricultural  colonists.  As  a  result, indigenous resource management
regimes are discarded.
Ecuador's property rights regime is  entirely representative of
institutional  conditions throughout  Latin America.  In  every country with
extensive tropical  forests,  the public sector's claims on  tree-covered  land
far outstrip  its  ability to manage or to control  resources.  Accordingly, open
access problems  are chronic.  Throughout  the  region, deforestation is  a
prerequisite  for formal  tenure.  Agricultural  colonists in  the Brazilian
Amazon, for example, obtain title in  a  forested parcel  only by  clearing a
large part of it  (Mahar, 1989).  By the same token, tenure insecurity is  a
problem in  most of Latin America.  IERAC's time-consuming  adjudication
procedures  are followed throughout the  region by counterpart agencies
established in  the early 1960s  under the auspices  of the Alliance for
Progress,  as de Soto  (1989) has documented vividly in  a  case study undertaken
in  Lima,  Peru.  Finally, suppression of indigenous groups' tenurial
arrangements is  the norm in  many  Latin American countries.
In  the  sections that follow, we describe how each  of these elements of
the institutional  order in  Latin America contributes  to  depletive human
interaction with  the natural  environment.
OPEN ACCESS PROBLEMS
Four specific  institutional  incentives  for deforestation are  relevant to
much  of Latin America.  The first  of these is  the problem of "open access."5
The distinction  between "open  access"  and  "common property"  is  a  celebrated
one in  the resource economics literature,  although one continually finds
confusion  between  the concepts  at the level  of both theory  and policy.  As
Ciriacy-Wantrup  and Bishop  (1975) clearly show, common property (res  communes
in  Roman law) and  open access  (res  nullius) are  two quite different  structures
of property rights.
Often, what  appears  to the outside observer to  be open access may
involve tacit cooperation by individual  users according  to a  complex set of
rules  specifying rights of joint use.  This is  common property.  Empirically,
it  is  crucial  to distinguish between open access  and common property if
appropriate policy is  to be  formulated.  Problems of open access  arise from
unrestricted entry, whereas problems of common property  result from tension in
the structure of joint use  rights adopted by a  particular village or group.
These tensions may arise from a  variety of complex causes,  including
population pressure, changes in  technology, climate, or political  forces.  Too
often, these causes have been  confused, and the problem ascribed  simply to the
"Tragedy of the Commons,"  in  which the misuse of resources is  attributed to
the  institution of common property  itself.
A  fundamental  issue in  much of the developing world  is  the degree to
which resource mismanagement has  actually been caused by  common property
arrangements.  In  the  Sahel  and  southern Africa, for example,  serious misuse
of resources  has  been  alleged to be  the direct result of traditional  common
property institutions  (see Hitchcock, 1981;  Picardi  and Seifert,  1976;  Glantz,
1977).  In  response, Western  economic consultants and  planners have called  for
the imposition of private property rights  (Johnson, 1972;  Picardi,  1974).
Similarly motivated private property  schemes have  been attempted throughout6
the developing world.  Many, perhaps most, have failed to  stop overuse,  and  in
many  cases may  have contributed to  even more rapid degradation of resources
and  increased inequality in  already unequal  distributions of wealth.  Not
unlike the European experience with enclosure, lands  formerly held  in  common
are  often transferred to  individuals  (such as  high-ranking government
bureaucrats) who can  exercise  influence in  the allocation  of use rights.
These individuals  have then failed to manage these resources effectively.
Despite this record, such  policies are  often  supported by  those who  argue on
theoretical  grounds that individual  incentives  inevitably lead  common property
to  be mismanaged.  Modern economists often refer to  this  as  the  "free  rider"
problem.  When  applied  to resource management, the free rider problem leads to
the conclusions that common property is  not  a  viable  institutional
alternative.
Yet common property may be as viable as  private property  on grounds of
both efficiency and equity.  Rather than  representing an  atavistic arrangement
of rights which  inevitably results  in  inefficient  resource use, much value may
lie  in  existing common  property institutions,  as  well  as  in  new institutional
arrangements with common property characteristics.  In  many cases, these
institutions  are well  adapted to  the particular resource constraints  facing
villages  and groups  in  developing countries.  In  this sense  they relate to
work on  institutional  constraints  and  innovation  developed by Hayami  and
Ruttan  (1985).
In  Ecuador and throughout  Latin America, state claims of property rights
are  unenforceable and essentially meaningless.  Furthermore,  by  undercutting
legitimate  systems  of common property,  such claims lead  to  a  system of open
access,  to which the only apparent solution  is  often  argued to  be7
"privatization."  The result is  that the possible  advantages of common
property management are lost in  the shuffle.
THE CYCLE OF EXCESSIVE LAND CLEARING AND EXCESSIVE SOIL EROSION
To  avoid open access  problems of the type described in  the preceding
section, the governments of Ecuador and other  Latin American countries
routinely transfer natural  resources to private parties.  The legal  tradition
governing this transfer dates to the early days of the colonial  era, the  first
European settlers in  the Andes having been ceded  "idle"  lands  (tierras
baldias)  only when they proposed to  use those lands  for crop  or  livestock
production.  This tradition is  deeply  imbedded in  formal  as well  as  informal
property  law.  IERAC and  counterpart agencies in  neighboring countries have
required that  idle forests  be converted  into  "productive" cropland or pasture
before recognizing  private rights in  a  colonized  parcel.  At the same  time,
agricultural  use rights are  the central  feature of informal  tenure regimes
throughout Latin America.
Vesting private  tenure in  those who convert tropical  forests  into
agricultural  land serves  powerful  political  and economic  interests.  The
establishment of  "live frontiers" is  viewed in  many countries  as  a  way to
strengthen a  nation's territorial  claims in  the Amazon  Basin  and other remote
areas  (Landau,  1980).  In  addition, the migration  of the  rural  poor to the
frontier tends to vent  social  pressures that can  lead to  political  conflict
(Blaikie, 1985).  However, where land  clearing is  a  prerequisite for property
rights, a  cycle of excessive  clearing and soil  depletion  tends to  be  set in
motion.
The  institutional  underpinnings of this cycle can  be clarified with  the8
aid  of a  model,  developed  by  Southgate  (1990),  that describes  the opportunity
costs of inputs  allocated to deforestation  and  soil  conservation  (ND and Nc,
respectively) as well  as  the returns to those  same inputs.  Opportunity costs,
W,  are  an  increasing function  of the  sum of ND and Nc:
W =W [N D + N]  W'  >  0 . (1)
The returns  to land clearing,  RD,  comprise the present value of crops grown on
newly deforested land less  the discounted opportunity cost of agricultural
inputs employed on  that same land.  In  general,  those returns  are an
increasing and  concave function of the extent of deforestation, which  can be
represented  as  ND divided by  the  inputs needed to  clear a  unit  of land, d:
RD = RD  [ND/d]  RD'  > 0  RD" < O  . (2)
The returns to  erosion control,  Rc,  comprise  two parts.  The first  is  the
present value  of additional  crop production that comes about because a  higher
level  of soil  quality is  maintained.  The second part is  the present value of
any persisting reduction in  crop production costs.  Each element  of Rc is  an
increasing and  concave function of the area where erosion control  measures  are
being applied, which can  be  represented  as  Nc divided  by the  inputs needed to
control  erosion  from a  unit of land, c:
Rc =  Rc  [Nc/d]  Rc'  >  0  Rc" <  0 . (3)
Since agricultural  colonists  are preempted  from capturing  non-
agricultural  rents  (e.g.,  the net returns  to forest management),  they try to
maximize the present value of additional  crop production associated  both with
soil  conservation  and land  clearing  less the  opportunity costs  of those two
activities.  This is  accomplished by  satisfying two  first order conditions:
W'  =  Rc'/c  and  (4)
W'  =  RD'/d  . (5)9
Equation (4)  indicates that a  settler should  increase inputs allocated to
erosion  control,  Nc, up to the point where Nc's  marginal  opportunity cost, W',
equals  the marginal  returns  of those same  inputs:  Rc'/c.  A  similar rule,
expressed  in  equation  (5),  governs a  colonist's decisions regarding ND.
The  inefficiency of the second guideline, equation  (5),  is  obvious.
When the tenure regime prevents  individuals from capturing non-agricultural
rents,  agriculture's extensive  margin is  found where agricultural  rents  equal
zero.  By  contrast, the agricultural  frontier is  found where agricultural
rents equal  non-agricultural  rents whenever settlers are in  a  position  to take
into account the returns  and  costs associated with non-agricultural  land  uses.
As settlers respond to  institutional  incentives by  allocating too  many
inputs to  land clearing, a  second  inefficiency arises.  With ND  set too  high,
inputs' current scarcity value rises.  This,  in  turn,  discourages erosion
control.  The  linkage between  Nc and  ND is  appreciated  by referring to a  four
quadrant diagram  (Figure  1),  the northeastern  and  southwestern quadrants of
which  show Rc'/c and  RD'/d, respectively.  Also  indicated in  the southwestern
quadrant is  the difference between RD'/d  and the marginal  rental  value of
tree-covered  land, C/d.  The marginal  opportunity cost of inputs  currently
allocated  to  soil  conservation  and  land clearing, W',  is  shown in  the
northwestern quadrant  and the  sum of Nc and ND is  represented in  the
southeastern quadrant.  Note that,  if  the tenure regime were to change  so that
farmers could  internalize the marginal  rental  value of tree-covered land,  not
only would  inputs allocated to deforestation decline,  from ND to  ND',  but  the
associated decrease in  wages would  induce an  increase in  conservation  effort,
from Nc to Nc'.10
The cycle of excessive deforestation and insufficient  erosion control
that  is  set  in  motion  by  a  frontier tenure regime  is  not necessarily
decelerated by a  change in  non-institutional  incentives.  Lower interest rates
or  higher commodity prices,  for example, enhance both  the present  value of
crops grown  on deforested land and  the present value of additional  crop
production associated with  erosion control.  These  impacts  are represented by
outward displacement of the  two functions,  Rc'/c  and RD'/d,  shown  in  the
northeastern and  southwestern quadrants, respectively,  of Figure  1.
Responding  to this shift  in  incentives, settlers  allocate more labor to  soil
conservation  as  well  as  to deforestation.
Whether N*  and ND rise  or fall  in  response to  increased timber prices
depends entirely on  the tenure  regime.  If  non-agricultural  rents  (value C in
the model)  can  be captured,  then  the price  increase discourages  land clearing,
ND.  As a  result,  the current opportunity cost of labor falls,  which in  turn
causes Nc to rise.  Under a  frontier tenure regime, by  contrast, settlers
selling logs  removed  from land  to  be used  for agricultural  production  treat
timber values as  a  negative  argument of land  clearing costs.  Consequently, an
increase  in  those values enhances RD/d,  both  absolutely and  relative to  Rc/c.
As  illustrated in  Figure 2,  this  accelerates deforestation and discourages
soil  conservation.
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND BUREAUCRATICALLY  INDUCED TENURE INSECURITY
Legal  traditions governing the  transfer of tierras baldias  to  private
parties are  not  the only way  that property  rights are attenuated  in  Latin
America.  Bureaucratically  induced tenure  insecurity is  also chronicthroughout the region.  Furthermore, just as a  cycle of excessive
deforestation  and  insufficient erosion control  arises where agricultural  use
rights are a  major feature of the  institutional  order,  insecure property
rights contribute to depletive  human  interaction with  the natural  environment.
In  part, tenure insecurity discourages resource conservation by reducing
the chances that current land  users will  capture the  long term benefits of
resource conservation.  A  typical  situation arises when a  farmer has doubts
about when  or if  his  application for  formal  tenure will  be  accepted.  At least
for  the time being, that farmer will  not  adopt erosion control  measures, for
example,  that enhance crop yields only after the passage  of several  years.
Insecure property rights also  contribute to  resource degradation by
impeding access to  formal  credit.  In  most  Latin American countries, public
sector development banks loan  money only to  those farmers whose  land has been
adjudicated.  Private banks, of course, do not accept non-adjudicated  land as
collateral.  Denied access  to formal  credit, farmers without clear title to
their land must  rely on  informal  credit markets, in  which  interest rates  are
considerably higher.  This discourages  the adoption  of conservation measures
(e.g.,  a  switch to agroforestry)  that carry  short term costs.
The  results of empirical  research carried  out in  a  number of developing
countries bolster the argument  that insecure property  rights influence
decisions regarding the  use and management of natural  resources.  Feder et  al.
(1988) have found a  clear statistical  relationship between  the strength of
farmers'  formal  property rights  and their willingness to  invest in  land
improvements.  In  Latin America, Southgate et  al.  (forthcoming) have
identified a  statistically significant linkage between deforestation and
tenure  insecurity in  eastern  Ecuador's Amazonian  lowlands.  The latter  finding12
bears  out  the claim that agricultural  colonists  safeguard their tenuous  legal
claims on  land by using  it  continuously for crop and livestock production
(Rudel,  1983).
The problem of insecure property rights  is  chronic  for  Latin America's
small  farmers.  That same group also tends to  be concentrated on
environmentally fragile  lands.  Accordingly, enhancing tenure  security  is  an
essential  element of strategies  to the region's  renewable natural  resources.
THE DEMISE OF  INDIGENOUS TENURE REGIMES
Tenure  insecurity is  not a  problem only for recent migrants to the
agricultural  frontier.  The property rights of  indigenous forest dwellers  are
also  in  jeopardy.  As a result, the latter group is  encouraged to participate
in  the destruction of the habitat from which it  has  traditionally drawn
sustenance.
The  assault on  forest dwellers'  tenure  is  often direct.  The creation of
parks and military zones  and  other forms of resource nationalization  renders
irrelevant the structure  of rights  and duties previously developed  by the
local  community.  Similarly, recognizing  private land  claims while  ignoring
communal  claims, as  several  Latin American governments have done  from time to
time,  assures the demise of common property, which is  the predominant  form of
tenure in  Latin America's tropical  forests.  Because it  has tended to
obfuscate the distinction between open access  resources  and common properties,
the economic literature addressing the  tragedy of the commons has  legitimized
this policy  approach.
More subtle  forms of pressure are often  applied against forest  dwellers'
communal  property arrangements.  In  many countries, registering a  communal13
claim requires more time, money, or legal  expertise  than registering an
individual  claim.  This is  an  important drawback for indigenous groups, which
have limited  financial  means as  well  as  restricted access to  legal  services.
In  addition, when governments  state that land uses  characteristic of communal
tenure regimes are  "non-tenurable,"  those regimes tend  to break down.  From an
individual's standpoint, for example, the net benefits of observing  fallowing
norms are seriously diminished by  laws, such  as  those that exist  in  much of
Latin America,  that make land  "improvement"  a  prerequisite for formal  tenure.
Because improvement has,  in  practice,  been equated with deforestation,
forsaking encroachment on a  fallow parcel  carries the risk that someone else
will  assert an  individual  claim on  that same parcel.  Anthropological  case
studies,  like the one carried out  by Macdonald  (1981),  show that  indigenous
forest dwellers respond to  this risk by forsaking  traditional  common property
arrangements and  becoming  agents of deforestation.
A  variant  of a  model  first developed by  Schelling  (1973)  can  be  used to
understand  this  response.  Described in  that model  are  the benefits for an
individual  of cooperating in  a  collective resource management scheme as  well
as  the private benefits of defecting from the  scheme.  The former equal  the
individual's  share of total  net returns of the scheme captured  by the
cooperating coalition.  Generally, the private benefits of cooperating
increase as  the  size of the coalition  increases.  The benefits  for an
individual  of defecting, which  are also a  positive function  of the number of
agents who join the  cooperating  coalition, consist of part or  all  of the
benefits of the collective scheme not captured by  the coalition  along with
other net  returns of individual  action.
If  the private benefits  of defecting exceed the  private benefits of14
cooperating  regardless of the  size of the cooperating coalition  (i.e.,  if
defection is  a  universally dominant strategy),  the game is  a  multi-person
prisoner's dilemma.  In  such a  game,  individuals must be  coerced  into adhering
to a  mutually beneficial  collective arrangement.  Another possibility is
depicted in  Figure 3,  which describes  the benefits to one  individual  of
cooperating or defecting in  a  strategically  interdependent game with n  + 1
players.  If  a  "minimum coalition"  of n*  or more  players is  assembled in  that
game,  then other  individuals will  freely choose to cooperate  as  well.
Setting deforestation  as a  prerequisite for property rights  reduces the
private benefits  of cooperating  in  traditional  collective resource management
schemes.  Within the context  of the model,  this event is  represented by
downward displacement of the curve  relating private benefits  of cooperation  to
the size of the cooperating coalition  (see  Figure 4).  If  those benefits  fall,
stronger  forms of coercion must be  used to make  individuals observe group
rules.  Alternatively, it  becomes more difficult to  raise within a  group the
minimum coalition  needed to  bring about universal  voluntary agreement in
collective schemes.  As  illustrated in  Figure 4,  a  decline in  the private
benefits of cooperating results in  an  increase  (from n*  to n**)  in  the  size of
the minimum coalition needed to effect a  collective management scheme.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Institutional  reform is  always a  politically charged undertaking.
Ideologues  of the right, who  have supreme confidence  in  the workings of the
marketplace, argue that  all  natural  resources should be divided among  private
holdings,  the owners of which  can be  expected to develop their properties
efficiently.  They distrust any deviation  from a  perfectly comprehensive15
regime of private tenure, expecting  that a  tragedy of the commons  will  arise
wherever a  resource is  not privately owned.  At the same  time, ideologues of
the  left doubt that  market exchange of private  interests  in  natural  resources
can  ever result  in  their being used wisely.  Only government, they reason,  is
capable of developing  resources efficiently.
Neither perspective should  be neglected.  Most societies  are very
comfortable with the  idea of dividing  agricultural  land, for example, among
private holdings.  Provided nonpoint pollution  associated with agricultural
production does not  result  in  major downstream costs, there  is  no strong
reason  for government to  interfere in  private decisions regarding the  use,
management, or exchange  of agricultural  holdings.  By  contrast, some  resources
(e.g.,  the air we  breathe) cannot be  divided among  private holdings.
Government must  take primary responsibility for the conservation  of such
resources.
Of course, the dogmatic  right  is  loathe to  acknowledge  instances in
which tenurial  arrangements  favored  by the  left are suitable.  Similarly, it
is  difficult to convince  the rigid  left that  decisions regarding  the use and
management of many resources are best  left to  individual  property owners
heeding price  signals generated in  unregulated, competitive markets.
Furthermore,  both  extremes share  an  ideological  blindspot.  As Hayami  (1988)
points out, neither  the left nor he  right has  been prepared  to admit  the  value
of "intermediate"  tenurial  arrangements:  the  institutions communities  around
the world  have long  used to deal  with  "local  externalities."
Local  externalities are a  universal  feature  of agriculture  and natural
resource development.  For example, one farmer's water use is  bound to have a
direct effect on  the welfare  of his  neighbors just  as  his welfare  is  greatly16
affected  by their water use.  Economists are  only now beginning  to recognize
that game theory and  other models can  be  used to  explain why an  individual
agent facing such a  situation finds  that  his or her personal  welfare is
enhanced by  voluntarily cooperating in  collective institutional  arrangements
(e.g.,  a  village  level  water rationing scheme) developed to address  local
externality problems  (Schelling, 1973;  Axelrod, 1984).
As a  consequence of growing  interest in  such  arrangements, however, the
"menu" of tenurial  solutions to  third world environmental  problems is  being
expanded.  It  has  always  included the  policy prescriptions of the right  (i.e.,
strengthening  or establishing  private property  rights)  as  well  as  those of the
left  (i.e.,  increasing public  sector control  of resources).  Intermediate
approaches  (i.e.,  reenforcing the  institutions communities  have long  used to
resolve local  externality problems)  are now generally accepted  as  being worthy
of consideration  as  well.
More than anything else,  applying the menu of tenurial  solutions  to
resource degradation problems  requires hard-headed economic objectivity.  That
is,  all  costs and advantages of different tenurial  approaches  to any
particular environmental  issue must be carefully assessed.  For example,
before deciding to draw on  the strengths of a  regime of private property
rights,  the costs of establishing and  administering  such a  regime, which  can
be considerable  (Runge, 1986),  need to  be  investigated.  Similarly, heavy
reliance on  community-level  arrangements is  a  suitable  approach to
environmental policy  only when local  externalities are  truly  important.
Finally,  even when  the  impacts of resource degradation  are  broadly
distributed, government  action is  called for only if  expected improvements in
environmental  quality compare  favorably to the  costs  of that  action.17
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Regimes
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